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Enforcing Corporate Social Responsibility
Codes Under Private Law: On the
Disciplining Power of Legal Doctrine
JAN M. SMITS*
ABSTRACT

A central question in the debate on corporate social responsibility is
to what extent CSR codes can be enforced among private parties. This
contributionargues that this question is best answered by reference to the
applicable doctrinal legal system. Such a doctrinal approach has
recently regained importance in American scholarship, while it is still
the prevailing method of legal analysis in Europe. Applying a doctrinal
analysis of CSR codes allows for the possibility of private law
enforcement, that is, enforcement by means of contract or tort, dependent
on three different elements: the exact type of claim that is brought, the
evolving societal standards about the binding nature of CSR codes, and
the normative complexity of the doctrinal system itself. This approach
allows for a typology of cases in which the enforceability of CSR codes
can be disputed. It is subsequently argued that societal standards have
not yet reached the stage where the average consumer who buys a
product from a retailer can hold that retailer legally liable for violations
of the norms incorporatedin the code.
INTRODUCTION

There are many perspectives one can adopt in reflecting upon the
enforcement of corporate social responsibility codes. Thus, selfregulation in the field of corporate social responsibility (CSR) has been
3
2
looked at extensively from the sociological,' psychological, ethical,
* Professor of European Private Law, Maastricht University. This contribution is
based upon the talk given at the HiiL-MEPLI Round Table Enforcing Corporate Social
Responsibility, Maastricht 17 October 2014. Many thanks to Anna Beckers, Jan Eijsbouts,
Mark Kawakami and Mieke Olaerts for valuable comments.
1. See generally Subhabrata Bobby Banerjee, Corporate Social Responsibility: The
Good, the Bad and the Ugly, 34 CRITICAL SOC. 51 (2008) (analyzing the contemporary
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economic,' and business5 perspectives, as well as from a plethora of
different legal perspectives ranging from, inter alia, international and
criminal law to environmental and private law.' This multidisciplinary
approach reflects the nature of CSR itself, famously characterized by
Archie Carroll as forming a pyramid of different (economic, legal,
ethical, and philanthropic) responsibilities.' This focus on different
perspectives in understanding CSR is in many ways unique for an
academic subject: although countless topics in present-day academia
lend themselves to be looked at from different angles, only a few are
actually discussed in that way. At the same time, whether caused by
paying particular attention to the nonlegal aspects or not, one striking
aspect of most CSR literature is that it is often more focused on the
desirability of legal enforcement rather than on its viability. In other
words, many arguments from a social, political, or ethical standpoint
can be put forward in favor of enforcing CSR codes, but these arguments
are only relevant for the law if they are accepted as legal arguments. In
this respect, CSR scholarship can suffer from the same drawback as
discourses of corporate social responsibility); Gunther Teubner, Corporate Fiduciary
Duties and Their Beneficiaries:A FunctionalApproach to the Legal Institutionalizationof
Corporate Responsibility, in CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND DIRECTORS' LIABILITIES:
LEGAL, ECONOMIC AND SOCIOLOGICAL ANALYSES ON CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY

149 (Klaus J. Hopt & Gunther Teubner eds., 1984).
2. See generally Martijn W. Scheltema, Assessing Effectiveness of International
PrivateRegulation in the CSR Arena, 23 RICH. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 263 (2014) (taking
an economic, sociological, and psychological/behavioral approach rather than a purely
legal approach to assess the effectiveness of international private regulation).
3. See generally Enrico Cavalieri, Ethics and Corporate Social Responsibility,
SYMPHONYA EMERGING ISSUES MGMT., no. 2, 2007, at 24 (arguing that companies are
part of a society that hopes for, conceals, and expresses culture and moral aspirations and
values).
4. An overview is provided by Markus Kitzmueller & Jay Shimshack, Economic
Perspectiveson CorporateSocial Responsibility, 50 J. ECON. LITERATURE 51 (2012).
5. See generally Esben Rahbek Pedersen, Modelling CSR: How Managers Understand
the Responsibilitiesof Business Towards Society, 91 J. Bus. ETHICS 155 (2010) (developing
a model of how managers perceive the responsibilities of business towards society).
6. The literature is abundant. Instead of and apart from many others, see ANNA
BECKERS, ENFORCING CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY CODES (2015); ANDREAS
RUHMKORF, CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY, PRIVATE LAW AND GLOBAL SUPPLY
CHAINS
(2015);
THE
NEW
CORPORATE
ACCOUNTABILITY:
CORPORATE
SOCIAL
RESPONSIBILITY AND THE LAW (Doreen McBarnet et al. eds. 2007); JENNIFER A. ZERK,
MULTINATIONALS
AND
CORPORATE
SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY:
LIMITATIONS
AND
OPPORTUNITIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006).

7. Archie B. Carroll, The Pyramid of Corporate Social Responsibility: Toward the
Moral Management of OrganizationalStakeholders, BUS. HORIZONS, July-Aug. 1991, at
39, 40-43; see also Archie B. Carroll, History of Corporate Social Responsibility: Concepts
and Practices, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF CORPORATE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 19, 33-

35 (Andrew Crane et al. eds., 2008).
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academic work on the subject of human rights, namely to be carried
away by what is desired rather than discussing what is legally possible.'
This contribution aims to show that the question-to what extent
legal enforcement of CSR codes (either of a global or a national nature)
is possible-is best answered by reference to the applicable doctrinal
legal system. Such a doctrinal approach has recently regained
importance in American scholarship, while in Europe it has been and
still is the prevailing-though often criticized-method that is used both
by academics and practitioners. The by-product of this approach is that
it highlights the "disciplining power" of legal doctrine. My claim is that
the doctrinal system allows us to test any new topic, including the
potential binding effect of CSR codes that challenges the boundaries of
legal enforceability. This does not mean that ethical concerns or social
norms do not play their part, but their proper role in determining
enforceability is defined by the doctrinal system itself and not by any
outside concerns. Put differently, the legal system is the best judge of
which societal concerns should be incorporated in the law.
The focus of this article is on enforcing CSR codes in relationships
among private actors, either companies or individuals. I do not deny
that questions of enforceability of such codes can also be asked outside
of private law, as in criminal law, international law, or financial law,
but these are not discussed here. This is also the reason why I avoid the
term "public" enforcement and use "legal" enforcement instead.
The discussion will unfold as follows. In Part I, I describe what it
means to ask whether CSR codes can be enforced. It will show that this
is in fact a highly complex question that, despite the international
character of CSR norms, can only be answered within the framework of
a domestic legal system. Part II substantiates which advantages can be
expected from a doctrinal approach. This is elaborated upon in Part III,
which takes up the relevance of well-established contract law doctrine
for the enforceability of CSR codes. It concludes that CSR codes cannot,
in principle, be enforced against actors other than the immediate
contracting party.
I. THE ENFORCEABILITY OF CSR CODES: A MULTIFACETED QUESTION

For the sake of this contribution, CSR codes can be broadly
described as guidelines that intend to describe companies'
8. Cf. Eric Posner, The Rise and Rise of Human Rights Scholarship in Law Reviews,
ERIC POSNER (Mar. 11, 2014), http://ericposner.com/the-rise-and-rise-of-human-rightsscholarship-in-law-reviews/ ("[Imnternational law scholars think that human rights
deserve vastly more attention than (say) trade law or even the United Nations. In truth,
human rights law is of limited practical importance in international relations . . . ").
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responsibilities in the areas of human rights, labor, the environment,
and socially sensitive business in general. Although it is not impossible
that such codes partly overlap with existing law, most of the rules
contained therein will consist of "voluntary" duties, that is, duties that
are not binding as a result of previous legislative or judicial
intervention. CSR codes exist at both the international and national
level, including the 2011 U.N. Guiding Principles on Business and
Human Rights,9 the 2011 OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises, 0 the British 2014 Ethical Trading Initiative Base Code,"
the 2008 Dutch Corporate Governance Code, 2 and the 2011 German
Sustainability Code.13 Businesses can decide to follow these public codes
but can also draft their own tailor-made guidelines, examples of which
include Coca Cola's Code of Business Conduct, Primark's Code of
Conduct, 4 and many other individual supplier codes of conduct.
Although these sets of norms are primarily meant to prescribe a
company's ethical obligations, the important question is whether they
could also have a legally binding effect. Some argue that these codes
(regardless of whether they are of a public or a private nature) reflect an
emerging system of non-state law and could therefore be binding as
such." Others argue that private law "needs to recognize these
corporate codes as evolving serious unilateral forms of regulation" and
make enforcement possible.' 6 My contention is that such statements
9. Special Rep. of the Sec'y-Gen., Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights:
Implementing the United Nations "Protect, Respect and Remedy" Framework, Hum. Rts.
Council, U.N. Doc. A/HRC/17/31 (Mar. 21, 2011) [hereinafter UN Guiding Principles].
10. Org. for Econ. Co-Operation & Dev. [OECD], OECD Guidelines for Multinational
Enterprises (2011), http://www.oecd.org/corporate/mne/48004323.pdf.
11. ETHICAL

TRADING

INITIATIVE,

THE

ETI

BASE

CODE

(2014),

http://www.ethicaltrade.org/resources/eti-base-code.
12. CORP. GOVERNANCE CODE MONITORING CoMm., DUTCH CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
CODE: PRINCIPLES OF GOOD CORPORATE GOVERNANCE AND BEST PRACTICES PROVISIONS

(2008), http://www.commissiecorporategovernance.nl/download/?id=606.
13. RAT FUR NACHHALTIGE ENTWICKLUNG [COUNCIL FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT],
THE GERMAN SUSTAINABILITY CODE (GSC): RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE GERMAN COUNCIL
FOR SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (2012), https//www.nachhaltigkeitsratdefileadmin

Lmigrated/media/RNETheGermanSustainabilityCodeGSC

textNo_41_January_2012.pdf

14. THE COCA-COLA CO., CODE OF BUSINESS CONDUCT: ACTING WITH INTEGRITY
AROUND THE GLOBE (Apr. 2009), http1/www.coca-colacmpany.com/contentldam/journey/us/en/
private/fileassets/pdil2012/11/COBCEnghshtpdf PRIMARK, SUPPLIER CODE OF CONDUCT

(2016), https/Aww.primark.com/en/our-ethicsworkplace-rights/code-of-conduct
15. See, e.g., BECKERS, supra note 6, at 26-27. See generally Gunther Teubner, SelfConstitutionalizingTNCs? On the Linkage of 'Private"and "Public" Corporate Codes of
Conduct, 18 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 617 (2011) (arguing that the intertwining of
private and public corporate codes represent the beginnings of specific transnational
corporate constitutions conceived as constitutions in the strict sense).
16. BECKERS, supra note 6, at 30.
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reflect a preconceived opinion about the binding effect of CSR codes,
while the answer to the question of whether they are legally binding can
only be answered by reference to the existing law in a given situation.
This calls for a brief exposition of the conceivable claims that can be
brought among private parties for violation of CSR codes." The
variation lies in the potential plaintiffs, the possible ways in which CSR
codes are used, the wording of the code, and the likely damage that can
occur.
First, which potential plaintiffs come to mind when a company is
sued for not complying with a CSR code? If, for example, garment
company A states that it will observe a CSR code that ensures safe and
hygienic working conditions in the manufacturing of the apparel it sells,
but its suppliers or subsuppliers do not provide for a safe working place
or clean toilet facilities for their employees, who could have an interest
in enforcement? In fact, this could be anyone within the supply chain
because all parties within the chain share one another's reputational
risks. Thus, potential claimants could range from the consumer to A's
retailers, and any other suppliers or subsuppliers and their employees
within the chain. In addition, organizations representing consumers,
employees, or even the general public could consider defending the
general interest they have in compliance with CSR norms.
Second, the type of claim can differ depending on the way in which
A uses the CSR code. The code could be incorporated in A's contract
with its main supplier; could be referred to in that same contract, in an
umbrella agreement, or in general conditions; could be mentioned on A's
website; could be imposed upon A's business partner B as part of
contracts that B concludes with third parties; and could be advertised
toward government bodies, potential consumers, or the public in general
as a code that A complies with.
Third, the wording of the norms incorporated in CSR codes is
relevant for the question of enforcement." Although companies may
have an interest in keeping the wording that they use as vague as
possible, reality demonstrates that different companies use different
wording, reflecting different grades of self-commitment. So it does make
a difference whether a company only promises to improve or strive for
better working conditions among its suppliers, or firmly agrees to

17. For a more extensive and alternative categorization, see id. at 47-148 (examining
whether corporate codes qualify as legally binding agreements, and, if so, what exact
substantive legal obligations are created).
18. Cf. id. at 81-106, 233-48 (examining whether corporate codes qualify as
enforceable unilateral promises through the study of German and English laws;
examining which parties become bound by publicly declared social codes).
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comply with all applicable local legal requirements at the supplier's
location. 19
Fourth, the type of damage (or, more generally, the effect of
noncompliance) is important in assessing potential liability. The
damage in the above example of not providing appropriate toilet
facilities for employees cannot be compared to discrimination, the use of
child labor, or an unsafe working environment of the type that resulted
in the Bangladesh Rana Plaza garment factory collapse in 2013, which
killed more than 1,100 workers. This could result in a claim for both
economic and nonpecuniary damages.
All four factors make up for the great variety of potential claims
that can be brought in case of noncompliance with CSR codes. This
makes it obsolete to ask about their binding effect in general, because
this will depend entirely on whether, in the given combination of these
four factors, enforcement is possible. The sparse amount of cases in
which a claim was filed show that the closer the relationship between
the claimant and defendant, the higher the chances of success.
For example, the University of Wisconsin's claim for breach of
contract against its direct contracting partner Adidas for not complying
with anti-sweatshop provisions requiring Adidas to provide certain
benefits to workers producing college-branded apparel, led Adidas to
pay compensation by way of settlement to 2,700 workers in Indonesia. 2 0
But when employees of Wal-Mart's foreign suppliers in China,
Bangladesh, and Indonesia made claims to improve local labor
conditions, they failed, even though Wal-Mart was eager to advertise
that it only used responsible suppliers. The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found it impossible to regard the
employees as third-party beneficiaries of standards Wal-Mart obliged its
suppliers to use. 2 The recent class action by victims of the Rana Plaza
19. For empirical work on how companies use their codes, see generally Martin
Herberg, Global Legal Pluralism and Interlegality: Environmental Self-Regulation in
Multinational Enterprises as Global Law-Making in RESPONSIBLE BUSINESS: SELFGOVERNANCE AND LAW IN TRANSNATIONAL EcoNOMIC TRANSACTIONS 17 (Olaf Dilling et al.
eds., 2008) (empirically using a homogenous set of actors to explore structures which
constitute the common standard of conduct); LOUISE VYTOPIL, CONTRACTUAL CONTROL IN
THE SUPPLY

CHAIN:

ON

CORPORATE

SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY,

CODES

OF CONDUCT,

CONTRACTS AND (AVOIDING) LIABILITY (2015) (focusing on the extent of legal responsibility
and liability for CSR violations in the supply chains of multinational corporations in the
Netherlands, England, and the state of California).
20. See Adidas Lawsuit (re University of Wisconsin), BUS. & HUMAN RIGHTS RES. CTR.
(Jan. 1, 2001), http/business-humanrights.org/en/adidas-lawsuit-re-university-of-wisconsin
#cl8941.
21. Doe I. v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 572 F.3d 677, 681-82 (9th Cir. 2009) ("Plaintiffs'
allegations are insufficient to support the conclusion that Wal-Mart and the suppliers
intended for Plaintiffs to have a right of performance against Wal-Mart under the supply
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disaster and their families against Bangladesh and retailers, including
Wal-Mart and JC Penney, on the basis that the defendants were aware
of the unsafe conditions and failed to properly inspect the building,
shared the same fate for lack of a sufficiently close relationship between
the user of the CSR code and the alleged victims.

22

Therefore, it does not make much sense to speak about enforcing
CSR codes in general because each type of claim needs to be assessed
separately. The geographical location at which the claim is assessed also
has an impact. Although CSR is supposed to relate to international
standards, it lacks an international mechanism to hold violators liable.
One needs to turn to domestic remedies in order to establish whether
enforcement is possible. 23 It is true that this also raises an issue of
jurisdictional competence, 24 but more important for this contribution is
that this makes the success of a claim dependent on different national
substantive laws that can all differ with regard to the potential range of
claimants, the damages they allow, and the legal consequences of the
exact wording of the code.
I now turn to the important question of how to assess the binding
effect of CSR codes within the context of some national law. In Part II, I
wish to show that the doctrinal approach offers the best possible avenue
to reach an outcome that is both legally and societally acceptable.
II. THE POWER OF LEGAL DOCTRINE
It is no secret that the doctrinal approach to law is no longer very
much in vogue. Doctrinal work consisting of a systematization of the
positive law from an internal perspective is frequently seen as too
contracts.... We therefore conclude that Plaintiffs have not stated a claim against WalSee
Mart as third-party beneficiaries of any contractual duty owed by Wal-Mart .).
also infra Section II.
22. Rahaman v. J.C. Penney Corp., Inc., No. N15C-07-174, 2016 WL 2616375, at *10
(Del. Super. Ct. May 4, 2016) ("Just as in Doe I v. Wal-Mart, Plaintiffs in this case have
failed to allege facts to establish that Defendants owed Plaintiffs a duty of care.
Defendants were not Plaintiffs' direct employer. Additionally, Plaintiffs have failed to
demonstrate that an exception to the general rule for independent contractor liability
exists. Plaintiffs' allegations are insufficient to prevent dismissal.").
23. See, e.g., John Ruggie (Special Representative of the Secretary-General), Business
and Human Rights: Mapping International Standards of Responsibility and
Accountability for CorporateActs, 111 22, 27, 29, 80, U.N. Doc. A/IHRC/4/35 (Feb. 19, 2007).
24. Jurisdiction was a key issue in the well-known case of Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013), in which the U.S. Supreme Court did not establish
jurisdiction but rather applied a presumption of extraterritoriality to a claim under the
Alien Tort Statute brought by foreign plaintiffs (Nigerian citizens) against foreign
defendants (certain Dutch, British, and Nigerian) for alleged human rights violations in a
foreign country (Nigeria).
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positivistic and not creative enough. "Law and. ." approaches, such as
economic, empirical, psychological, and literary analysis of law, seem to
have acquired a higher prestige in today's academia. 25 This development
can be clearly detected in the United States but has also affected legal
scholarship in Europe. However, partly influenced by criticism from
legal practice, 26 a reverse trend is noticeable. The intellectual
underpinning for this comes from the American "New Private Law"
movement headed by John Goldberg and Henry Smith. 27 They argue
that legal doctrine reflects the complex coherence of the law and is
therefore indispensable to understand what the law is about.
This view aligns with what Europeans, perhaps unconsciously,
regard as the underlying rationale of legal doctrine. 28 Doctrine
represents the normative complexity of the law: the thousands of rules
and decided cases, each with their own nuances organized as a system,
show the many ways in which the law deals with conflicting arguments.
Doctrine thus reflects how subtle the law often is and why a small
change of the facts can lead to an entirely different outcome. Competent
lawyers make things difficult, not to keep themselves busy, but because
they know that subtle nuances are relevant. Joseph Singer put it like
this: "Law is complicated because qualitative distinctions matter, and
they matter at this level of detail."29 The elaboration of the doctrinal
system is therefore not an etheric activity unconnected to reality but an
essential part of the legal activity aiming to capture the subtleness of
the law and thus to help solve practical problems.3 0 Reducing the law to
principles or social policies cannot sufficiently express this complexity.

25. The classic reference is to Richard A. Posner, The Decline of Law as an Autonomous
Discipline: 1962-1987, 100 HARV. L. REV. 761 (1987). On this development in Europe, see
JAN M. SMITS, THE MIND AND METHOD OF THE LEGAL ACADEMIC

(2012).

26. See, e.g., Richard Brust, The High Bench vs. the Ivory Tower, ABA JOURNAL (Feb. 1,
2012, 11:00 AM), http/www.abajournalmim/magazine/article/the high-bench vs._the ivory tower
(statement of U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts) ("Pick up a copy of any law
review that you see . . . and the first article is likely to be, you know, the influence of
Immanuel Kant on evidentiary approaches in 18th century Bulgaria.").
27. See John C.P. Goldberg, Introduction:Pragmatism and PrivateLaw, 125 HARV. L.
REV. 1640 (2012) (discussing the connection between legal pragmatism and private law
skepticism).
28. See Jan M. Smits, What is Legal Doctrine? On the Aims and Methods of Doctrinal
Legal Research (Maastricht European Private Law Inst., Working Paper No. 2015/06,
2015) (seeking a better understanding of the aims and methods of doctrinal legal
scholarship).
29. Joseph William Singer, Normative Methods for Lawyers, 56 UCLA L. REV. 899, 938
(2009).
30. See SMITS, supra note 25, at § 45; cf. Goldberg, supra note 27, at 1652 ("[B]eing
nuanced about legal concepts can help us think through practical problems.").
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With this, legal doctrine can also serve as a justification for the
existing law. Succinctly put, if a rule does not fit into the system, it is
not law. Here, the essence of the internal perspective on law comes out
best: if the law is presented as a self-contained system of mutual
references, the validity of norms can be justified by reference to this
system itself. This is why Ernest Weinrib has argued that formalism is
a theory of legal justification.31 Formalism presupposes a view of law as
an "immanently intelligible normative practice": a legal system is
already justified by its own coherence that will have to be permanently
readjusted on the basis of new judicial decisions, legislation, and
changing societal views of what is right.32
Legal doctrine then legitimizes the new solution because it fits
within the system that is accepted and used by the legal community.
Put differently, systematic thinking is always based on the ideal of
integrity because it requires legal solutions to be constructed in a way
that best fits and justifies the law as a whole.33 This is what I mean by
the disciplining power of legal doctrine: it is not, at least primarily,
extra-legal considerations that guide the search for the best outcome but
rather the extent to which the outcome fits the system. The legal system
functions as a filter or "reality check" that requires a legal actor to think
through the legal acceptability of the proposed outcome. This does not
mean that society's changing views of what is right should not play their
part, but they always have to pass the test of legal doctrine before they
can be elevated to having any legal significance. The underlying
rationale for this view can be found in different directions. For one, it
fits in with the common understanding of using the doctrinal system in
order to ensure the consistency and predictability of the law. But a
sound doctrinal underpinning is also necessary in order to obtain the
approval of the legal community: it is unlikely that a court would
enforce a CSR code with a mere reference to what is societally desired.
An illustrative example of this disciplining use of the doctrinal
method is provided by the reasoning of the United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit in the case of Doe v. Wal-Mart Stores.3 4 As
already indicated, in this case, employees of Wal-Mart's foreign

&

31. See Ernest J. Weinrib, Legal Formalism: On the Immanent Rationality of Law, 97
YALE L.J. 949, 951-53 (1988) ("Formalism postulates that law is intelligible as an
internally coherent phenomenon . . . . It affects one's view of the nature of legal
justification. . . .").
32. Ernest J Weinrib, The Jurisprudenceof Legal Formalism, 16 HARVARD J. OF L.

PUB. Policy 583, 583 (1993).
33. See Mathias M. Siems, Legal Originality, 28 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 147, 150
(2008). See generally RONALD DWORIGN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986) (explaining how the AngloAmerican legal system works and on what principles it is grounded).
34. Doe I, 572 F.3d at 681-85.
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suppliers brought an action claiming that Wal-Mart was liable for not
complying with the labor standards specified in its supply contracts.
While plaintiffs in this foreign liability claim" referred to emerging
societal views about the importance of corporate social responsibility,
the court undertook a meticulous inquiry into the possible grounds for
civil liability. In doing so, the court applied well-established doctrines in
the law of contract and tort with reference to California law and the
relevant Restatements. Apart from the question of whether the wording
of the code imposed any obligation on Wal-Mart, the court rejected the
plaintiffs' argument that they were third-party beneficiaries of the
standards in Wal-Mart's supply contracts was rejected on the ground
that the obligation for suppliers to comply with standards is an
obligation between Wal-Mart and its suppliers and not one between
Wal-Mart and the plaintiffs. Similarly, the court rejected the claim that
Wal-Mart was the joint employer of claimants as this would have
required Wal-Mart to have had control over day-to-day employment,
and this was not the case. The third argument, based on tort law, that
Wal-Mart negligently breached a duty to monitor its suppliers, was
similarly dismissed given that such a duty could not be found in existing
laws. Finally, the court also held that Wal-Mart was not unjustly
enriched by the mistreatment of suppliers' employees. A claim in
restitution can only lie if it is unjust for the person receiving the benefit
to retain it and a prior relation between the enriched and the
impoverished exists, neither of which was the case here.
This example shows the disciplining power of the doctrinal system
in deciding enforceability of CSR codes. This does not mean that one
needs to agree with the reasoning of the California court. One may
wonder, in particular, whether the court should have paid more
attention to the fact that Wal-Mart and its suppliers are part of the
same supply chain, and parties within this chain could, under some
circumstances, be identified with each other for the sake of civil
liability.36 For example, if parties within the chain share each other's
profits and liabilities (which will depend on the exact design of the
relationships among the various parties) and operate in a coordinated
way toward the outside world, one cannot exclude that liability of the

35. See generally Liesbeth F.H. Enneking, Crossing the Atlantic? The Political and
Legal Feasibilityof European Foreign Direct Liability Cases, 40 GEo. WASH. INT'L L. REV.
903 (2009) (providing an overview of current communal political, legal, and practical
circumstances in Europe that affect the feasibility of foreign direct liability cases before
courts in the European Member States).
36. See, e.g., L.K.L. Tjon Soei Len, The Effects of Contracts Beyond Frontiers: A
Capabilities Perspective on Externalities and Contract Law in Europe (2013) (unpublished
Ph.D. thesis, University of Amsterdam) (on file with University of Amsterdam).
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foreign supplier vis-A-vis its employees could also lead to liability of the
Western company. For example, in the law of negligence, societal views
of what is required from a multinational company can enter the legal
system through social norms such as what can be expected from a
prudent or reasonable person. We will see that contract law employs
similar notions of evolving societal standards. However, whether one
specific domestic law can be stretched to reach a desired effect will be
dependent not only on the extent to which society considers a certain
type of liability appropriate, but also on how it can be accommodated
within the existing doctrinal system.37
To further substantiate this point, I will now consider one possible
head of liability for enforcing CSR codes. Part III, thus, will be devoted
to asking which possibilities general contract law offers for
accommodating such codes. My goal is to show how the enforceability
question can be answered by reference to well-established contract law
doctrine.
III. CSR CODES AND CONTRACT DOCTRINE
An important part of the contract law doctrine deals with
distinguishing between enforceable and non-enforceable promises. The
search for the foundation of binding promises is, in many respects, the
core question in the intellectual history of the field." This is not the
place to discuss the many different theories that have been put forward
and that have sought the basis for contractual liability in factors such as
3 9
intention, reliance, declaration, Geltungserkldrung, speech act,
promise, or benefit. 40 This is an ongoing discussion that receives new
37. See BECKERS, supra note 6, at 39-213 (offering an impressive analysis of potential
grounds of liability, ranging from contractual third party rights, negligence, contract with
protective effect vis-A-vis third parties, and culpa in contrahendo to assumption of
responsibility and unfair commercial practices).
38. See JAMES GORDLEY, FOUNDATIONS OF PRIVATE LAW: PROPERTY, TORT, CONTRACT,
UNJUST ENRICHMENT 289-306 (2006) (examining why promises or expressions of will are
binding and whether a party could be bound without a promise as a result of preliminary
negotiations). See generally JAMES GORDLEY, THE PHILOSOPHICAL ORIGINS OF MODERN
CONTRACT DOCTRINE (1991) (tracing the development of modern contract law and positing
that the fundamental concepts and doctrines of private law stem from the attempted
synthesis of Roman legal texts and the moral theology of Thomas Aquinas).
39. Anna Beckers ultimately regards a CSR code as a speech act or a performative act
that not only describes but also changes social reality. See BECKERS, supra note 6, at 47107. However, the problem with speech act theory is that it does not make clear whether
parties have at all made use of a rule of contract law. Rather, it is the context that decides
whether such an act was performed.
40. See generally ROBERT A. HILLMAN, THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS
AND CRITIQUE OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW (1997) (compiling,
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impetus every time a new societal phenomenon needs to be "tested"
against the prevailing theory. In the last few decades, these phenomena
have inter alia included letters of intent, comfort letters, and unilateral
promissory statements of government bodies.4 ' In this respect, CSR
codes are only the next type of document that contract law doctrine
needs to accommodate.
It is useful to make a distinction between the theoretical foundation
of contractual liability and the criteria used in practice for establishing
such liability. Even though modern legal systems tend to focus on the
intention to create legal relations and require consensus ad idem,42 in
reality a whole set of objective factors play a role in assessing whether a
binding contract actually exists. These factors include the proximity
between the person making the declaration and the addressee, whether
the addressee could reasonably understand the declaration in question
as reflecting the promisor's intention to be legally bound and how easy it
is for the addressee to investigate this, whether the transaction would
be beneficial or detrimental to each of the parties, what is customary in
a certain branch, and the expertise and experience of the parties. In
brief, the court is looking for a good reason to hold the promise binding
and employs a multifactor approach to realize this. 43
This approach can also be used to assess the binding effect of CSR
codes. The proximity between the user of the CSR code and the
claimant, as previously demonstrated in the Doe v. Wal-Mart case,
already poses a limit to contractual enforceability." This can be
substantiated by reference to three possible situations. The least
presenting, and evaluating a wide variety of theoretical work on contract law, including
the relationship between a promise and a benefit).
41. See generally JOHANNES KONDGEN, SELBSTBINDUNG OHNE VERTRAG: ZUR HAFIUNG
AUS GESCHAFTSBEZOGENEM HANDELN [SELF-BINDING WITHOUT CONTRACT: LIABILITY

THROUGH BUSINESS-RELATED CONDUCT] (1981) (discussing classical societal phenomenon
which seek the basis for contractual liability).
42. See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN CONTRACT LAW ch. 2, § 1, art. 2:101 (EUROPEAN
UNION 1998) ("A contract is concluded if the parties intend to be legally bound, and they
reach a sufficient agreement without any further requirement."); RESTATEMENT (SECOND)
OF CONTRACTS § 2(1) (AM. LAW INST. 1981) ("A promise is a manifestation of intention to
act or refrain from acting in a specified way, so made as to justify a promisee in
understanding that a commitment has been made.").
43. See P.S. ATIYAH, ESSAYS ON CONTRACT 40-72 (1986) (discussing the moral and
legal approach to hold a promise as binding). See generally JAN M. SMITS, CONTRACT LAW:
A COMPARATIVE INTRODUCTION (2014) (treating contract law as a discipline that can be
studied on the basis of common principles and methods without being tied to a particular
jurisdiction or legal culture).
44. Although the term "proximity" is mostly used in the context of tort law, it also
plays an essential role in the law of contract in that it requires the promisor and the
promisee to be in a sufficiently close relationship to justify the promise being legally
binding.
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problematic situation is when two companies simply agree in their
contract that one will comply with a CSR code and the other brings a
claim for noncompliance. In this case, the code is likely to have become
part of the contents of the contract, giving rise to a performance action
(for example, enforcement of the specified labor standards) and possibly
to actions for termination or damages. The fact that the two parties act
in a commercial context adds to the presumption that they have the
intention to be legally bound.45
The most problematic situation is when a company indicates to the
outside world that it considers itself bound to a CSR code, but the party
pursuing the remedy is not in any direct relationship with that
company. The previously mentioned case of the employee working for a
supplier in Bangladesh (as in the American case of Doe v. Wal-Mart
Stores) is a good example: this employee will not be able to bring a claim
against the American company for lack of a contractually relevant
relationship between claimant and defendant. I have argued above that
this could be different in the case in which parties within the supply
chain can be identified with each other because they share profits and
liabilities and operate in a coordinated way toward the outside world,
but this will be an exceptional case.
The third, intermediate, situation consists of the average consumer
buying a product from a retailer (say Wal-Mart, Primark, or H&M) that
declares it is complying with CSR codes, but in fact it is not. Does this
allow the consumer to bring a claim for performance or damages?
Proximity is not a problem in the proposed multifactor approach, but
46
examination of the other factors shows that a claim is not evident.
First and foremost, it must be questioned whether the consumer
could reasonably understand the CSR code to reflect the company's
intention to be legally bound. This is a matter of how a reasonable
person would consider the binding effect of such a code. The often vague
and open-ended wording of the code plays a role here, but the more
important point is what social conventions dictate about the binding
status of CSR codes. They surely contain committing language aiming to
win trust among consumers, but these commitments are not necessarily
regarded as legally binding in society. In the reflection of the average
consumer, they will be more about the intention of retailers to morally
do good than to legally be bound. The fact that CSR codes are generally
47
seen as containing voluntary norms does not help.
45. See SMITS, supra note 43, at 71.
46. But see BECKERS, supra note 6, at 175 (reaching a different outcome and arguing in
favor of legislative intervention to regulate third-party rights).
47. Voluntarism, which "impl[ies] that CSR exclusively covers the domain 'beyond the
law,"' figures prominently in Jan Eijsbouts' list of CSR characteristics. See JAN EIJSBOUTS,
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A second relevant factor in this respect is that the reasonable
consumer will understand that to make these obligations binding in law
would create a great burden for the retailer. The law is generally
suspicious of altruism and presumes that a party will only bind itself if
it is to gain from the transaction. 48 Any consumer must understand that
when buying apparel or other products at competitive prices in the
familiar retail outlets, a commitment to promote socially responsible
business may reflect the retailer's ethical concerns but is not a legally
enforceable guarantee that CSR norms are in fact kept. 49 This could be
different in specialized stores that are visited by consumers who go
there, not for a cheap bargain, but for the sake of buying socially
responsible manufactured products such as fair trade coffee or clothing.
Research shows that people are willing to pay more for such products;"o
if they in fact do, and make the conscious choice to buy at a higher price
in order to act in a socially responsible way, it also raises the buyers'
expectations of the seller.
The latter case shows how societal views and legal doctrine interact.
What qualifies under the law as reasonable expectations of contracting
parties is directly influenced by social norms." In most cases, the
company's promise toward consumers to act socially responsible is at
best morally binding. This does not mean that no sanctions exist if a
company does not comply with a CSR code, but these are at best
economic or social sanctions. However, that is not to say that they are
any less effective in fighting corporate human rights violations: insofar
as potential contracting partners, banks, and investors require proof of
effective compliance with CSR norms before entering into business with

CORPORATE RESPONSIBILITY, BEYOND VOLUNTARISM: REGUIATORY OPTIONS TO REINFORCE
THE LICENCE TO OPERATE 12 (2011).

48. On gratuitous transactions and altruism, see SMITS, supra note 43, at 70.
49. But see Hugh Collins, Conformity of Goods, the Network Society, and the Ethical
Consumer, 22 EUR. REV. PRIV. L. 619 (2014) (expressing a different and cautious view and
asking whether the reasonable expectations of consumers include reference to the means
of production up the supply chain and an expectation that the goods will not be produced
through the use of labor that is employed under conditions that violate European Union
labor laws, international labor standards, and human rights law).
50. See Robert Gielissen, Why Do Consumers Buy Socially Responsible Products?, 2
INT'L J. Bus. & Soc. SCI., no. 3, Jan. 2011, at 21 (2011) (taking a qualitative approach to
answering why consumers buy socially responsible products, often at higher costs).
51. This will be associated with the incorporation of evolving business practices in the
binding contract, a topic much discussed in the US in the context of Article 2 of the
Uniform Commercial Code, but equally relevant in Europe where these practices enter the
legal system through open-ended concepts such as good faith and reasonable parties. See
U.C.C. § 2 (AM. LAW INST. & UNIF. LAW COMM'N 1977).
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52
a party, there exists an obvious incentive to do the right thing. This is

less so with the average consumer, who is in most cases more motivated
by the low price or the quality of the product than by its provenance.
CONCLUSION

Enforcement of corporate social responsibility comes in many
varieties of both a legal and a nonlegal nature. The possibility of private
law enforcement-that is, enforcement by means of contract or tort-is
dependent on three different elements: the exact type of claim that is
brought, the evolving societal standards about the binding nature of
CSR codes, and the doctrinal system. First, the claim can vary
depending on the potential plaintiffs, the possible ways in which CSR
codes are used, the wording of the code, and the damage that occurs.
Second, societal standards inform us how business and consumers
consider CSR codes. Although these standards are permanently
evolving, they have not yet reached a stage where the average consumer
who buys a product from a retailer can legally hold that retailer liable
for violations of the norms incorporated in the code. Third, this outcome
is guided by an application of the criteria used in legal doctrine to
distinguish between binding and nonbinding promises. Factors such as
the proximity between the person making the declaration and the
addressee, whether the addressee could reasonably understand the
declaration in question as reflecting the promisor's intention to be
legally bound, and whether the transaction would be beneficial or
detrimental to each of the parties serve to guide us toward the
appropriate conclusion. The doctrinal approach thus allows us to carry
out a "reality check": no matter how noble our intentions in defending
the binding effect of CSR codes, we need the disciplining power of legal
doctrine to keep our feet on the ground.

52. See Mark Kawakami, Pitfalls of Over-Legalization: When the Law Crowds Out and
Spills Over, 24 IND. J. GLOBAL LEGAL STUD. 147 (2017) (focusing on consumer
empowerment to discuss the potentially higher effectiveness of social sanctions in the CSR
field).

